Laws in the special sciences are usually regarded to be non-universal. A theory of laws in the special sciences faces two challenges: (I) According to Lange's dilemma, laws in the special sciences are either false or trivially true; (II) they have to meet the Requirement of Relevance, which a way to require the non-accidentality of special science laws. I argue that both challenges can be meet, if one distinguishes four dimensions of (non-)universality. The upshot is that I argue for the following explication of special science laws: L is a special science law iff (1) L is a system law, (2) L is quasi-Newtonian, and (3) L is minimally invariant.
(2) It is a plain fact that the special sciences -possibly, in contrast to physics -cannot rely on universal laws. This tension can be formulated as the nomothetic dilemma of causality and explanation (cf. Pietroski and Rey 1995, 85, Woodward and Hitchcock 2003, 2 
):
First horn: If it is a plain fact that the special sciences cannot rely on universal laws (assumption 2) and if most philosophical theories of causation and explanation essentially involve universal laws and we do not reject these theories (assumption 3), then there is no causation and, as well, no explanation in the special sciences (negation of assumption 1).
Second horn:
If there is causation and, as well, explanation in the special sciences (assumption 1) and if it is a plain fact that the special sciences cannot rely on universal laws (assumption 2), then there is causation and explanation that does not involve universal laws (negation of assumption 3), i.e. we have to reject the above listed theories of causation and explanation in their standard form.
If we do not want to give up the immensely plausible opinion that the special sciences refer to causes and provide explanations (assumption 1) for purely philosophical reasons, then we are in need of a theory of non-universal laws. So, I will opt for the second horn of the nomothetic dilemma.
Cf. Earman, Roberts and Smith (2002, 297f) , Woodward (2002, 303) , Kincaid (2004) , Roberts (2004) . As 8 noted above, Cartwright (1983 Cartwright ( ), (1989 and Mumford (2004) dispute the claim that paradigmatic laws of physics conform to the received philosophical picture (e.g. being universal). However, they do not deny that that laws in the special sciences are non-universal, have exceptions etc.
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In this paper, I argue as follows: in section 2, I will introduce Lange's Dilemma stating that non-universal laws are either false or trivially true. In section 3, I refer to an attempt to avoid Lange's Dilemma proposed by Paul Pietroski and Georges Rey (1995) .
Pietroski and Rey attempt to save a cp-law L from being trivially true by explaining counter-instances to L. Although this account has been criticized on good grounds, I think the basic idea is fairly correct. Even its critics, John Earman and John Roberts (1999) among others, sketch a way to repair the account by Pietroski and Rey. Earman and Roberts require that a story has to be told about the relevance of the antecedent for the consequent of a law statement (Requirement of Relevance). I try to fulfill this requirement.
In the central section 4, I set up a theory of non-universal laws by distinguishing different meanings (or dimensions) of "non-universal". In section 5, I argue that this approach (a) allows to avoid Lange's Dilemma by conceiving special science laws as quasi-Newtonian, and (b) that it meets Roberts and Earman's Requirement of Relevance by spelling out relevance in terms of invariance. In section 6, I argue that the results of the preceding sections amount to this theory of special science laws: L is a special science law iff (1) L is a system law, (2) L is quasi-Newtonian, and (3) L is minimally invariant.
Challenge I: Falsity and Triviality
A philosophical reconstruction of lawish statements in the special sciences faces a severe problem, which can be articulated in the form of Lange 's Dilemma (cf. Lange 1993, 235) .
Here is the first horn:
First horn (Falsity): Strictly and literally speaking, special science laws are false because it is not the case that all Fs are Gs (if that is what the laws say).
For instance, the relationship between supply and price is not always as the law of supply says (or, as it seems to say prima facie), because an interfering factor might occur. In other ! 7 words, special science laws that instantiate perfect regularities are -mildly put -"scarce" (Cartwright 1983, 45 ). Yet, if one supposes that the law is to be formalized as a universally quantified conditional sentence. Then one counter-instance (due to a disturbing factor) to the universally quantified sentence means that it is false.
The second horn of Lange's Dilemma can be stated as follows:
Second horn (Triviality): If laws in the special sciences are cp-laws, then they are trivially true.
If we suppose that an implicit cp-clause is attached to the law then it seems to be equivalent with "All Fs are Gs, if nothing interferes". But then the cp-law in question is in danger to lack empirical content. It lacks empirical content because it seems to say nothing more than "All Fs are Gs or (it is not the case that all Fs are Gs)". Note that the second horn of Lange's dilemma seems to depend on the exclusive reading of the ceteris paribus clause ("if nothing interferes", "if all disturbing factors are absent"). If this were the correct theory of laws in the special sciences, then these laws would be analytically true sentences and, therefore, trivially true. Obviously, this is a bad result because laws of the special sciences should be reconstructed as (approximately) true empirical statements -not as sentences being true in virtue of the meaning of their components. Note that the second horn is a more pressing problem than the first, because I have already given up the assumption that special science laws are universal (as presupposed in the first horn) -to be precise, I reject the claim that special science laws are universal in two readings of "universal" (see Section 4). In the recent debate, some philosophers take Lange's Dilemma as a reason to be pessimistic about whether there really is a convincing explication of laws in the special sciences: " [...] there is no persuasive analysis of the truth conditions of such laws; nor is ! 8 there any persuasive account of how they are saved from vacuity; and, most distressing of all, there is no persuasive account of how they meld with standard scientific methodology, how, for example, they can be confirmed or disconfirmed. In sum, a royal mess." (Earman and Roberts 1999: 470f, my emphasis) So, to deal with this dilemma is clearly a central semantic challenge, which also has epistemological consequences as Earman and Roberts point out: in order to be empirically testable, special science laws have to be true (contrary to the first horn) and non-trivial (contrary to the second horn). In this paper, I will restrict my attention to the semantic challenge posed by Lange's dilemma. Pietroski and Rey (1995, 92) claim that it is sufficient for a law "cp,∀(x)Ax→Cx" to avoid Lange's Dilemma (i.e. to be neither necessarily false nor trivially true) if the following conditions are satisfied:
Challenge II: Requirement of Relevance
(1) A and C are nomological predicates. 9 (2) Assessing a law statement L "cp,∀(x)Ax→Cx" leads to a commitment which is expressed by the Explanatory-Commitment-Condition (ECC): If a counter-instance (A∧¬C) to law statement L occurs, then one is committed to explain ¬C by referring to a factor H which is independent of L. Pietroski and Rey allow two possibilities w.r.t. the independent explanatory force of H: (i) H alone explains ¬C, or (ii) H in conjunction with L explains ¬C.
(3) It is the case that either (i) A∧C, or (ii) A∧¬C and ECC is satisfied. Pietroski and Rey (1995, 92) argue that A and C are not "grue-like".
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According to Pietroski and Rey (1995, 90) , ¬C is explained independently of L by referring to H if (a) H is not a logical consequence of L (i.e. logical independence of H), and (b) the explanatory factor H is not an effect of ¬C (i.e. causal independence of H). The critics of this approach have argued that ECC is not sufficient for saving special science laws from Lange's Dilemma, because ECC allows that (1) A is completely irrelevant for C and (2) ¬C is still perfectly explained independently of L by a factor H (cf. Earman and Roberts 1999, 453f; Schurz 2001, 366f; Woodward 2002, 310) . Earman and Roberts provide the following counterexample: "Unfortunately, [Pietroski and Rey's proposal] is not sufficient for the nonvacuous truth of the cp-law. To see why, let "Fx" stand for "x is spherical", and l e t "Gy" stand for y = x and y is electrically conductive". Now, it is highly plausible that for any body that is not electrically conductive, there is some fact about itnamely its molecular structure -that explains its non-conductivity, and that this fact also explains other facts that are logically and causally independent of its nonconductivity -e.g., some of its thermodynamic properties. 
Four Dimensions of Non-Universal Laws
As I argued in the introduction, it is the received view that, in the special sciences, laws appear to be non-universal -or, they are said to 'have exceptions'. But what does it mean to be universal, and, respectively, non-universal? Surprisingly, in the recent debate on cplaws this question is not answered in a systematic way. The lack of a systematic approach 10 is a major problem, because universality is an ambiguous concept. In accord with Andreas Hüttemann (2007, 139-141) , we may distinguish four meanings or dimensions of universality with respect to a law statement:
(1) First Dimension -Universality of space and time: Laws are universal1 iff they hold for all space-time regions.
Notable exceptions are Mitchell (2000) and Schurz (2002) . "global" (see the quote in the introduction): "The dynamical laws of classical mechanics are complete and deterministic. Given the state at any time t they determine the state at any other time. The determination is global since the position and momentum of any particle at a time t+r is determined only by the global (i.e. the entire) state of that system at time t. That is, to know how any one particle moves at t+x one has to know something at each particle at t. The dynamical laws and a partial description of state at t (except in special cases) do not entail much about the state of the system at other times and, in particular, don't say much about what any particular particle will (was) doing at t+r." (Loewer 2008, 155) In contrast with the laws of classical mechanics, a special science law (such as the law of supply) is non-global, incomplete, and, thus, seems to provide only a "partial description" of the phenomenon it describes. Special science laws leave out other influences on the phenomenon i.e. circumstances that are not referred to by the law statement itself -as stated in the description of the third dimension of universality (cf. Pietroski and Rey 1995, 89) . ! 12 universality. This diagnosis amounts to a challenge: any theory of lawish generalizations in the special sciences is obliged to explain how a lawish statement can be non-universal3&4
and still play a lawish role.
Universality1 & 2: System Laws
Are special science laws universal in the first and the second dimension of universality? I think, the answer is yes. I will argue for two claims: first, lawish generalizations in the special sciences hold for all space-time regions (i.e. they are universal1), however these generalizations simply lack application in some space-time regions. Secondly, lawish statements in the special sciences can be reconstructed in a way that they do not quantify over a restricted domain of objects (i.e. they are universal2). Arguing for these claims might not seem plausible at first glance, because usually generalizations in the special sciences are interpreted as system laws. Gerhard Schurz (2002, Section 6.1) has introduced the notion of a system laws: while fundamental physical laws "are not restricted to any special kinds of systems (be it by an explicit antecedent condition or an implicit application constraint)" (Schurz 2002, 367) , system laws refer to particular systems of a certain (biological, psychological, social etc.) kind K in a specific space-time region.
Hence, so the usual characterization continues, lawish statements in the special sciences typically have an in-built historical dimension which the fundamental physical laws lack, because they are restricted to a limited space-time region where the objects of a certain kind K exist (for instance, cf. Beatty 1995 , Rosenberg 2001 So, according to Tooley, a law L can be spacio-temporally restricted to a space-time region s (as the laws in Smith's garden) in the sense that L fails to be true in a situation that is perfectly similar to the situation in s, except for the fact that this perfectly similar situation is located in a different space-time region s*.
I think that laws that are truly non-universal1 would be similar to the laws that true of various fruit in Smith's garden. But it seems to be a far too strong claim that laws in the special sciences are local in a way as the laws in Smith's garden are. Thus, it seems to be a more promising option to say that (a) special science laws are universal1 and (b) these laws simply lack application in some space-time regions. For instance, to say that the law of ! 14 supply does not hold on mars because there are no people buying and selling goods does not indicate that the law of supply is a local law. A better understanding seems to be that the law of supply factually has no application on Mars (or, it lacks instances on Mars). There is an alternative formalization that quantifies over a domain of all objects. This formalization interprets the kind of object (here: commodities) as a predicate and not as a restriction of the domain (with x as an individual variable for the unrestricted domain):
One could object that even if the restricted reading were the favored reading it would not be clear why the 14 corresponding universal statement should be true. Even the universal statement (quantifying only over commodities) is vulnerable to Lange's dilemma and the Requirement of Relevance. The lesson, I think, we should learn from this result is that the responses to these two challenges have to given w.r.t. to the third and fourth dimension of non-universality.
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The second, unrestricted formalization of the law of supply is a way to save universality2.
Formalizing special science laws in this form, reconstructs them as laws that hold for all objects.
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Obviously, I do not offer a theory for the first and second dimension of universality.
Such a theory would have to elucidate why generalizations that are universal1&2 are lawish.
All I did was to provide a reconstruction such that special science laws can be consistently understood as being universal1&2. This is not a trivial result, because philosophers, such as Beatty (1995) and Rosenberg (2001) , insist that generalizations in the biological and the social sciences should be regarded as (a) being historical in the sense of applying only to a specific space-time region (this is in contradiction with universality1), and (b) as referring to a restricted domain of objects (this contradicts universality2). Contrary to these philosophers, I merely wanted to point out that one can maintain that lawish generalizations in the special sciences are universal w.r.t. the first and the second dimension of universality. It is a matter of convention to still call these lawish statements "system laws" in order to highlight difference to fundamental laws.
In the following sections, I will argue that general statements play a lawish role, if they can deal with disturbing factors (dimension 3), and if they are invariant under different possible initial conditions (dimension 4). In other words, all the work is to be done by theories of non-universality3&4.
Non-Universality3: The Method of quasi-Newtonian Laws
How shall we deal with the third dimension, i.e. the fact that special science laws are sensitive to external factors? Recall that the second horn of Lange's dilemma presupposes a reconstruction of law statements that are qualified by only a cp-clause like "all disturbing
An anonymous referee has pointed out that one might want to dispute the claim that even the fundamental 15 laws do not apply to everything (contra Schurz 2002 , Hüttemann 2007 . S/he argues that the fundamental laws, for instance, do not apply to angels and numbers. However, I think that, even if this were the case, we could preserve the universality2 for the fundamental laws by exactly the same strategy which I just used for preserving universality2 for lawish statements in the special sciences. Further, my arguments do not have to rely on the characterization of fundamental physical laws which Schurz and Hüttemann provide. For instance, the law of supply states "If the supply of a commodity increases (decreases), then the price decreases (increases)". It is usually added to the antecedent "… while the demand for this commodity stays the same" which implies that the law of supply does not hold if the demand increases or decreases. At this point it is crucial to notice that the evolution of the price of a good is not described by a single generalization, i.e. by the law of supply. The evolution of the price also depends on another factor, the demand of a good, described by the law of demand: "if the demand for a commodity increases (decreases) while the supply remains the same, then the price increases (decreases)". It has to be emphasized that the equilibrium model of supply and demand also describes what would happen, if the demand does not remain the same. In other words, the evolution of the price of a commodity is described by an equilibrium model, according to which supply and demand can vary independently (Hausman 1992; Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995) .
In order to illustrate Mill's original idea how a disturbing factor can also be First, in the economic case (as well as in the island bio-geographical and the ecological case) it depends on pragmatic choice whether the law of supply or the law of demand is dubbed "inertial law". The important point for our purposes is that a larger 16 model in which the inertial law is integrated (e.g. the equilibrium model of a market)
describes that deviating behavior of the price evolution -that is, the behavior is deviating relative to a chosen inertial law such as the law of supply.
Second, in cases of special science laws the deviation laws are usually not universal1-4 as Newton's Second Law is.
Third and most importantly, those disturbing factors governed by the laws of deviation fall into two classes: those that are in the scope of a particular discipline and those that are not. For a special science, like economics, there will always be disturbing causes (such as comets) which will not be integrated in the models of this discipline.
Concerning these latter factors, we are committed to an existential claim if we want to maintain that special science laws are quasi-Newtonian: if a special science system deviates from its inertial behavior, then there are (known or unknown) laws of deviation describing the influence of disturbing factors on the inertial behavior. The examples 17 introduced in the preceding paragraph provide a good reason to believe that this existential A typical example is provided by causal models in econometrics: according to these models, the causal 16 influence of a variable in isolation is described by a single structural equation. Each one of those single equations might be called "inertial law". However, the whole causal model (i.e. a set of equations) provides an overall output resulting from the interaction of various causal factors (cf. Cartwright 1989, Chapter 4.5; Pearl 2005, Chapter 5).
Thanks to Tim Maudlin and Michael Strevens for suggesting this amendment.
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claim is likely to be true, because the influence of disturbing factors within a specific special science (e.g. micro-economics, bio-geography, ecology) is indeed described by a law of deviation. Since the scope of a special science is limited (e.g. influence of comets crashing on Earth is not described within economics) an advocate of the quasi-Newtonian approach has to make the amendment that there are -unlike in the case of Newtonian laws of motion -unknown disturbing factors and unknown corresponding laws of deviation from the point of view of a special science like economics. Michael Strevens (2010, section 3) argues for a similar point: the conditions of application of a special science law are partly "opaque" for the researchers, say economists, because the researchers lack complete knowledge of all disturbing factors and the laws of deviation governing them.
However, I agree with Strevens that the fact that economists have incomplete knowledge does not imply that the existential claim about unknown disturbing factors and unknown corresponding laws of deviation is false.
Despite these disanalogies, I think that the positive analogy remains intact: Some laws in physics and in the special sciences are quasi-Newtonian because the influence of a disturbing factor on a system describes by a law L is described (comparatively or quantitatively) by another law L*. What is the pay-off of invariance theory? Invariance theory does not require lawish statements to be universal4. Thus, adopting invariance theory seems to be a plausible way to account for the lawishness of generalizations that are non-universality4. Furthermore, My approach does not differ from Hitchcock and Woodward's invariance theory concerning the non-
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reductive feature of the explication of the concept of a lawish generalization. Both explications are nonreductive, because they use causal and nomological concepts in the explicans. I agree with Hitchcock and Woodward that the non-reductive character of an explication is unproblematic as long as the explication is not viciously circular. For a more detailed defence of non-reductive explication see Woodward (2003 Woodward ( : 103f, 2008 , Strevens (2008: 186) , Reutlinger (forthcoming). Recall Earman and Roberts's example of a spurious generalization in which the antecedent is irrelevant for the consequent: "all spherical bodies conduct electricity" (Earman and Roberts 1999, 253) . According to Hitchcock and Woodward's definition of minimal invariance, it might as well be that in fact all actual spherical bodies conduct electricity -however the correlation of being spherical and conductivity turns out to be accidental, because one can at least imagine a counterfactual situation in which a the geometrical shape of the body in question is changed from spherical to being cubical by intervention and, yet, the conductivity remains unchanged. Analogously, my causalisolation-version of invariance assumes that the counterfactual "if it were the case that (a) the geometrical shape of the body were cubical (and not spherical, as it actually is) and (b) the body were causally isolated, then the body would conduct electricity differently than it actually does" is false. This evaluation of the counterfactual is, of course, in accord with
Earman and Roberts's intuitions. Thus, both versions of invariance theories classify the ! 27 generalization "all spherical bodies conduct electricity" correctly as accidental, because counterfactual changes of the antecedent are irrelevant for a change of the consequent. In other words, being spherical fails to be relevant for conductivity of electricity, because the statement "all spherical bodies conduct electricity" fails to be minimally invariant.
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To sum up, quasi-Newtonian laws (i.e. a non-epistemic, objective, ontological version of Pietroski and Rey's ECC) and an account of relevance in terms of invariance are supplements for a theory of lawish statements in the special sciences.
Conclusion: The Explication of Special Science Laws
I started out by asking how non-universal generalizations in the special science can perform a lawish function. I have distinguished four dimensions of universality. Further, I
demanded to develop a theory for each dimension. I argued for preserving the universality in the first and second dimension for laws of the special sciences -taking this into account is still compatible with describing special science laws as system laws (cf. Schurz 2002).
The non-universality in the third dimension is taken care of by the Mill-Maudlin-view of quasi-Newtonian laws. We deal with the fourth dimension of non-universality by relying on the notions of minimal invariance. Based on these results, my explication of a special science law is the following:
A statement L is a special science law iff (1) L is a system law, (2) L is quasiNewtonian, and (3) L is minimally invariant.
I argued that this explication has several benefits: (a) it allows to avoid Lange's Dilemma, and, (b) it meets the requirement of relevance in terms of invariance. I dare to conclude 
